ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his paper investigates the effect of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O liability insurance) on audit effort of auditors. D&O Liability insurance is a liability insurance payable to top executives of a company as indemnification for losses or litigation costs from the lawsuits, and companies carry D&O liability insurance for protecting their directors and officers from the lawsuits. Therefore, D&O liability insurance is a safeguard to cover the monetary damage from litigation risks. However, carrying D&O liability insurance causes that managers become less risk averse. They are also less likely to reject attractive new risky projects with D&O liability insurance (Core, 1997) . Moreover, in the case of abusing the insurance, managers may take more risks and exhibit more opportunism than managers without D&O liability insurance. Previous studies provide evidence that managers of companies with D&O liability insurance have more opportunity to engage in earnings management (Narjess, Nabil, and Martin, 2008) . Also, in general, earnings management is more likely to occur in insured corporations than in uninsured corporations. In this circumstance, auditors may consider whether their clients are insured or uninsured as useful information for estimating clients' audit risks. If auditors use the information of D&O liability insurance for considering that insured companies have higher potential litigation risk than uninsured companies, there is a positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. To test the association, we uses audit hours and audit fees as proxies for audit effort.
Especially, Korean financial market provides a good research setting to examine the effect of D&O liability insurance on audit effort. First, D&O liability insurance is available in Korean setting because only Korean companies are required to disclose D&O liability insurance mandatorily until 2008 except Canada and Tawian companies. Next, since the establishment of the Securities Class Act in 2007, more than one third of Korean public companies carry D&O liability insurance and the demand of D&O liability insurance is sharply increased in Korea. Last, a few countires are required to disclose audit hours, but Korean companies are required to disclose both audit hours and audit fees to the public (Chun and Rhee, 2015) . For the above reasons, Korean finanical market is an appropriate setting to investigate the effect of D&O liability on audit effort. This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, there is no previous evidence on the direct positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort in Korea. This empirical evidence may shed a light on our understanding of managers' incentives on D&O liability insurance. Second, this study provides insight into auditors' belief about D&O liability insurance. Third, this study provides evidence that D&O liability insurance information is very meaningful to auditors. However, in Korea, disclosing D&O liability insurance information is not mandatory anymore after 2008. This study therefore suggests that policymakers should consider re-mandatory public disclosure of D&O liability insurance information for the market participants.
Using 2,026 Korean firm-year observations during 2005 to 2008 period, this study finds that there is a positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. It implies that auditors input more audit hours and charge more audit fees to the companies with D&O liability insurance than the companies without the insurance. Also, audit hours and audit fees are increased as the insurance coverage limit of D&O liability insurance is higher. The empirical results suggest that auditors use D&O liability insurance as useful information for evaluating their clients' audit risk.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, background information and developing hypotheses are introduced. In Section 3, the sample and the research method are described and in section 4, our empirical findings are presented. Finally, in section 5, conclusions and implications from the findings are drawn.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Recently, many corporations have become concerned about the possibility of lawsuits from investors and outside parties. For the reason, more companies began to carry the D&O liability insurance. D&O liability insurance is a method by which top executives of the company protects themselves or their organizations from damage or defense costs due to criminal, civil, or administrative legal action. As a study of D&O liability insurance, Tillinghast (2002) reports that approximately 19% of U.S. survey respondents experienced more than one claims against their companies' directors for a 10-year working periods, and all respondents' companies carried D&O liability insurance. Thus, D&O liability insurance is very common to U.S. public companies. In Korea, D&O liability insurance has been adopted by a few companies since 1991, but it is not widespread because corporate litigation is not prevalent. However, since the establishment of the Securities Class Act in 2007, litigation against public companies in Korea has increased. Now, approximately 36% of Korean public companies carry D&O liability insurance.
The main purpose of D&O insurance is to protect top executives of the company. However, when a company carries the insurance, it may affect managers' opportunistic behaviors. Core (1997) reports that directors and officers become less risk averse. They are also less likely to reject attractive new risky projects. In this circumstance, by abusing the insurance, managers of insured companies can take more risks aggressively and exhibit more opportunism than managers of uninsured companies. Narjess et al. (2008) provide evidence that managers of companies with D&O liability insurance have more opportunity to engage in earnings management. If auditors use the information of D&O liability insurance for setting the amount of audit effort, there will be a positive association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. In this study, audit hours and audit fees are used as proxies for audit effort. To investigate the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort, we set the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive association between audit effort and carrying D&O insurance.
Managers choose insurance coverage limits depending on their litigation risk. When companies are at high risk of litigation, they select higher insurance coverage limits (Core, 1997; O'Sullivan, 2002; Fier, McCullough, Mansfield, and Gabel, 2012; Gillan and Panasian, 2014) . When managers become entrenched or plan to invest in risky projects, they may extend their insurance coverage in order for maximum protection. We believe that the insurance coverage limit provides valuable information about the degree of litigation risk. Higher the insurance coverage limit of D&O insurance implies the higher the litigation risk.
Generally, companies consider their specific conditions such as level of litigation risks, financial status, and governance effects for purchasing D&O insurance. Thus, companies with D&O insurance may have different characteristics from companies without D&O insurance companies, and there may be a possibility of selection bias from total sample. Therefore, we sort the total sample into two groups: insured companies and uninsured companies. Then, we exclude uninsured companies to prevent the selection bias and examine the effect of D&O insurance using insured companies only. We state the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a positive association between the insurance coverage limit of D&O insurance and audit effort.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Sample Selection
The sample of companies in this study consists of Korean listed companies from 2005 to 2008 for which information about audit hours, audit fees, financial status, and D&O liability insurance coverage are available. To increase comparability, it selects companies that satisfy the following criteria (1) financial statement data with positive book value of equity available on the Korea Information Services Value (KIS-VALUE) database; (2) all of the proxies are available; (3) firms in non-financial industry; (4) fiscal year ended December 31. Financial data was collected from the Korea Information Services Value (KIS-VALUE) database and information about audit hours, fees, and D&O liability insurance were manually collected from each company's audit reports and annual reports from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System of the Financial Supervisory Service (http:// dart.fss.or.kr). This process yields final sample of 2,026 annual firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the sample distribution of the final firm-year observations for the empirical tests. 
Hypothesis Testing
To investigate the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort, the following model is used.
Model (1):
AUDIT EFFORT = β 0 +β 1 D&O (LCOV ) Note: LHOUR: natural log of audit hour; LFEE: natural log of audit fees; D&O: an indicator variable that equals one when the company has D&O liability insurance and zero otherwise; LCOV: natural log of the insurance coverage limit of D&O liability insurance; BIG4: an indicator variable that equals one when the audit firm is a Big4 auditor and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural log of total assets; ROA: ratio of net income to total asset; LEV: total leverage scaled by total assets; LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one when the company's net income is negative and zero otherwise; INVREC: sum of inventories and receivable divided by total assets; EXPRATIO: the ratio of oversea sales to total sales; DA: absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by Kothari et al. (2005) .
Multivariate Analysis for Hypothesis 1
Table 3 presents the regression results for testing hypothesis. This study examines the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. Audit hours and fees are used as proxies for audit effort. In column (1) of Table 3 , the dependent variable is the natural log of audit hours (LHOUR). The coefficient of D&O is 0.198 (t = 7.68), which is significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that when clients have D&O liability insurance, auditors perceive a higher litigation risk and therefore spend more time performing the audit in order to reduce their audit risk. The coefficients for BIG4, SIZE, and LEV are positive and significant, implying that these factors have a significant effect on audit hours. The coefficients for ROA and EXPRATIO are negative and not significant. Values for LOSS, INVREC, and DA are positive and not significant. In column (2) of Table 3 , the dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees (LFEE). The coefficient of D&O is 0.146 (t = 6.94), which is significant at the 1% level, implying that when clients have D&O liability insurance, auditors charge higher audit fees because they perceive that insured companies have higher litigation risk than uninsured companies. Therefore, auditors charge higher audit fees as a risk premium. The coefficients of BIG4, SIZE, LEV, and LOSS are positive and significant, indicating that these
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The Clute Institute variables have a strong effect on audit fees. However, the coefficients of ROA, INVREC, EXPRATIO, and DA are insignificant, indicating that these variables have little effect on audit fees. These results imply that auditors use the information about D&O liability insurance when they determine their audit hours and fees. According to previous studies, companies with opportunistic managers and weak governance tend to purchase D&O liability insurance (Chalmers, Dann and Harford, 2002; Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011) . Information about D&O liability insurance is therefore useful for prediction of litigation risk to third parties. Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. See the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. Table 4 presents the results of testing of the association between the insurance coverage limit of D&O insurance and audit effort. Insurance coverage limit indicates how much litigation risk companies cover. Therefore, auditors use information about D&O liability insurance as a proxy for estimating litigation risks. In column (1) of Table 4 , the dependent variable is the natural log of audit hour (LHOUR). Our variable of interest is the insurance coverage limit of D&O insurance (LCOV). The coefficient of LCOV is 0.079(t=3.52), which is significant at the 1% level. In column (2) of Table 4 , the dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees (LFEE), and the coefficient of LCOV is 0.110(t=5.70), which is significant at the 1% level. Through these results, this study provides evidence that auditors use insurance information when they provide auditing service. Auditors spend more time performing audits and charge higher audit fees when their clients has higher coverage limit of D&O insurance. Total number of observations for insured companies are 726 in the Table 1 , but 30 of them fail to disclose insurance coverage limit. Finally, 696 observations are used for testing hypothesis 2. 
Multivariate Analysis for Hypothesis 2
Additional Test
According to Table 2 , 68.6% of companies in total sample hire Big4 auditors. Even though we include a control variable of BIG4, it is difficult to control the effects of Big4 auditors perfectly. In general, Big4 auditors spend more time and charge higher fees for their services due to their reputation (Palmrose, 1986) . To remove the Big4 effect, we divide the sample into "companies audited by Big4 auditors" and "those not audited by Big4 auditors". In Table 5 , columns (1) and (2) present the results of testing of the association between D&O liability insurance and Big4 auditors' effort. In column (1), the dependent variable is audit hours (LHOUR). The coefficient of D&O is 0.202 (t = 6.66), which is significant at the 1% level. In column (2), the dependent variable is audit fees (LFEE). The coefficient of D&O is 0.136 (t = 5.70), which is significant at the 1% level. In columns (3) and (4), the results for the association between D&O liability insurance and Non-Big4 auditors' effort are listed. In columns (3) and (4), the coefficients of D&O are 0.131 (t = 3.68) and 0.152 (t = 3.64), respectively, which are significant at the 1% level. Both Big4 and Non-Big4 auditors spend more time and charge higher audit fees for insured companies due to their perception that the litigation risk is higher for the insured companies than for uninsured companies. Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. See the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the association between D&O liability insurance and audit effort. It provides evidences as to whether auditors use D&O liability insurance information when they set the amount of their audit effort. We find that auditors adjust their audit hours and fees when their clients carry D&O liability insurance. For clients with more expensive D&O liability insurance, auditors spend more time in order to minimize their audit risk and they also charge higher audit fees as a risk premium.
This study, however, may have limitations under following caveats. First, there is the possibilities of that the empirical results are depended on measurement criteria or time period. There may be other omitted factors which bias the empirical results. Second, our firm-year observations are constrained by the availability of D&O liability insurance, and thereby it may contain a bias that the observations are toward relatively large firms where face higher litigation risks. Therefore, it is challenging to say that the results can be generalized into a broader set of observations.
Despite these caveats, this study provides evidence that D&O liability insurance information is very meaningful and useful to auditors. D&O liability insurance is not mandatory disclosed as of 2008 in Korea. This study therefore suggests that policy-makers should consider re-mandatory public disclosure of D&O liability insurance information.
